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COMMENTS
ranty-allergy problem the ends of distributive justice demand a maximum
reasonable protection for the buyer. In the implied warranty under discus-
sion, reasonable fitness does fairly extend to minority classes of buyers who
may be injured from the use of a processed product. The maxim caveat vcn-
ditor, which concisely characterizes the present law of implied warranty in
sales, is consistent with a rule calling for protection for the so-called allergic
buyer, who is very often in fact one of the many who would be similarly in-
jured. With this basic goal as a guide, the application of the reasonable fit-
ness required by statute over the larger area suggested in this article can be
realized with the best interests of both parties to the sales transaction being
preserved.
THE DUTY OF A LABOR UNION TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IN
GOOD FAITH - AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM1
I. INTRODUCTION
An affirmative duty to bargain collectively and, with it, an obligation to
carry out that duty in "good faith" devolved upon labor organizations with
the passage in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley amendments' to the National Labor
Relations Act, commonly called the Wagner Act.2 On its face the placement
of such an affirmative duty on a union would seem superfluous This article
analyzes the wording of the statute, traces its legislative history, and reviews
the cases which have applied it in governing the conduct of labor unions. The
problem is to determine the nature of the union's duty particularly as it is
circumscribed by a statutory obligation of good faith.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari in
two cases which involve the good faith obligation in collective bargaining. 4
In both cases the National Labor Relations Board found a party guilty of the
unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain collectively by finding a violation
of that party's good faith obligationY In both cases a Court of Appeals re-
versed the Board's finding, refused to enforce the Board's order, and held that
the charged party had not failed to fulfill the good faith obligation.0 The
Truitt Mg. Co. 7 case involved the employer's obligation while the Textile
1. 29 US.CA. § 158(b) (3), (d) (Supp. 1955).
2. 29 US.CA §§ 151-66.
3. "It seems to me that unions would seldom refuse to engage in collective bar-
gaining since that is one of the primary, if not the primary, reasons for their exist-
ence.... . ." 93 Cong. Rec. 1844 (1947).
4. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., cert. granted, 390 US. 922 (1955); NLRB v. Textile
Workers Union, CIO, cert. granted, 350 US. 1004 (1956).
5. Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.RLB. 856 (1954); Textile Worlters Union, CIO, 103
N.L.RB. 743 (1954).
6. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955); Textile Workers Union,
CIO v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
7. See notes 4, 5, 6 supra.
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Workers Union case8 involved the union's obligation. In the Truitt case the
Supreme Court recently rendered a decision to which three justices dissented
in part.9 The Court reversed the Circuit Court decision and upheld the Board's
finding and order. 10 The Textile Workers Union case1 will be argued before
the Supreme Court shortly. The history of these cases suggests that the courts
and the National Labor Relations Board do not entirely agree upon the nature
of the duty to bargain when circumscribed by an obligation of good faith.
A multitude of cases have involved the employer's duty to bargain and their
cumulative effect in the evolution of a concept applicable to employers has
been digested in a number of articles1 2 because the duty first devolved only
upon the employer in 1935 with the passage of the Wagner Act.1a Since the
union's duty was created more recently, 4 fewer cases have interpreted it.',
For these reasons this discussion is confined to a consideration only of the
union's duty to bargain and good faith obligation. The express statutory obli-
gation of good faith superimposed upon the duty to bargain of both the em-
ployer and the union first appeared in 1947 in the definition of collective
bargaining as set forth in section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley amendments.10
An analysis of this section somewhat aids the discovery of the nature of the
good faith obligation which it imposes.
II. DIAGRATMATICAL ANALYsIS OF SECTION 8(d)
The following diagrammatical reproduction of the pertinent portions of sec-
tion 8(d) presents the precise wording of the section with added headings
(italicized) to reveal the relationship of the component phrases and clauses.
"For the purposes of this section,
A. In General
To bargain collectively is:
1. the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees.
a. to meet at reasonable times and
b. confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or
2. the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and
8. Ibid.
9. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
10. Ibid.
11. NLRB v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, cert. granted, 350 U.S. 1004 (1956).
12. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39
Mich. L. Rev. 1065 (1941), and cases cited therein; Annot., 147 A.L.R. 7 (1943), and
cases cited therein; Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1224 (1948), and cases cited therein.
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (Supp. 1955).
14. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(3) (Supp. 1955).
15. Cases cited notes 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 59, 60, and 63 infra.
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (Supp.1955).
[Vol. 2.5
3. the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation [pre-
sumably the obligation under A(l) above] does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession:
B. In Particular
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective bargaining contract
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bar-
gain collectively shall also mean .... "
This diagram reveals that the words "good faith" are used only in modifica-
tion of the verb "to confer". Such a grammatical construction would seem
to suggest that only acts or conduct which affect the subjective attitude of
the parties toward the process of conferring should become indicia of good
faith or the lack of it. This construction would further seem to suggest that
the other elements of the definition which the words "good faith" do not
modify should constitute distinct and separate objective requisites of the duty
to bargain collectively. Hence a failure to meet at reasonable times or a re-
fusal to execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached should,
as the Act provides, constitute in themselves a non-fulfillment of the definition
and thus it would seem a failure of the duty to bargain collectively. These
then should not be thought of merely as indicia of a lack of good faith. Like-
wise a direct refusal ever to meet, or ever to confer with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or ever to negotiate
should be viewed as a failure of the duty to bargain without reference to the
good faith element in the definition. Finally, the definition expressly elimi-
nates any compulsion to agree to a proposal or any requisite of making a con-
cession, and this suggests that these should not be considered as indicia of
good faith, or the failure so to do, as a lack of it.
Though these conclusions would seem to flow from the grammatical con-
struction of the definition as it was passed in Congress, their validity would
be conditioned upon their consistency with the views expressed by Congress in
reference to this section as well as section 8(b) (3) which imposed the duty
to bargain on the union. Hence a consideration of the legislative history of
these sections becomes germane.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The proposed House of Representatives amendment to the Wagner Act 17
both as reported and passed, contained a provision which made it an unfair
labor practice for a recognized or certified union to refuse to bargain collec-
tively.' 8 As stated in the report of the House committee, this had the effect
of making ". . the standards and definitions which have been discussed in
relation to section 2(11) apply in case of unions, as well as in the case of
17. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
18. Id. § 8(b)(2).
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employers."'1 Section 2(11) of the House bill2" contained by way of defini-
tion of collective bargaining, a number of requirements applicable equally to
unions and employers, and some which applied only to unions. Sub-section (A)
of 2(11)21 required that, if an agreement was in effect which provided a pro-
cedure for the settlement of disputes, the parties must follow such procedure.
Sub-section (B) 22 contained a detailed description of the collective bargaining
procedure, which included a specified number of meetings within a stated
period. It also included, as a condition for any lockout or strike, a procedure
for notifying the employees of the employer's last offer and for conducting
a secret ballot as to whether such offer should be rejected and a strike called.
In addition, it specified and limited the subjects which could be discussed in
the collective bargaining procedure and excluded therefrom such subjects as
welfare funds, pensions, checkoff, and a number of other commonly bargained
benefits. Section 2(11) rather conspicuously omitted any requirements that
the bargaining be in good faith.23
Thus, the imposition of the duty to bargain collectively on the union served,
in the House bill, as a device to make effective a series of defined proscrip-
tions against union action. The bill did not directly make the proscribed ac-
tions unfair labor practices, but instead required unions to bargain collectively
and then defined collective bargaining as refraining from engaging in the pro-
scribed practices.
The proposed Senate amendment to the Wagner Act24 also contained a pro-
vision making a union refusal to bargain collectively an unfair labor prac-
tice.25 It did not, however, contain the elaborate definition of the collective bar-
gaining process contained in section 2 (11) of the House bill's definition of collec-
tive bargaining. 20 This definition included, as the House bill did not, the
notion of good faith. It also included limitations upon the right to strike. In-
stead of the previously noted last offer ballot, however, section 8(d) limited
the right to strike by a requirement that notices be given to state and federal
mediation services and that there be a sixty-day cooling off period.27
Thus, section 8(b)(3),28 in conjunction with section 8(d) of the Senate
bill, performed only in part the same function as the similar provisions in the
19. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947).
20. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947); N.L.R.B., Legislative History of
the National Labor Relations Act pt. I, at 36-40, 163-67 (1947).
21. Id. § 2(11)(A).
22. Id. § 2(11)(B).
23. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-23, 30-31, 69-71 (1947); N.L.R.B.,
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act pt. I at 310-14, 321-22, 360-62
(1947).
24. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
25. Id. § 8(d); N.L.R.B., Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act
pt. I at 114-16 (1947).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. § 8(b)(3); N.L.R.B. Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act
pt. I at 112 (1947).
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House bill by placing limitations on the right to strike. The committee reports
do not indicate whether anything more specific was intended by these sections.
The majority report simply states that the obligation imposed by section
8(b) (3) upon unions ".... is the same as that imposed upon employers by
Section 8(a) (5)."29 The minority views of the committee apparently did not
regard the provision as significant enough to comment upon either favorably
or unfavorably.
In the debate on the Senate floor, a few Senators indicated what they had
in mind by the requirement that a union bargain collectively. Their com-
ments give an indication that at least some of the proponents of these sections
believed that union adamancy and the adoption of a "take it or leave it" atti-
tude would negate the good faith requisite of section 8(d) . They also sug-
gest that little critical analysis was given to the component requisites and at
least one Senator was dubious as to the feasibility of enforcement of a sub-
jective good faith requisite.31
Congress resolved in conference the differences between the Senate and
the House bill, with respect to the nature of the duty to bargain collectively,
largely by adopting the Senate version. The bills differed very little in the
specific provisions which required unions to bargain collectively. The major
differences existed in the definition of collective bargaining. On this issue
the House conference report first set forth the detailed procedures which had
been proposed by the House and then described the Senate amendment in
these words:
"The Senate amendment did not in the definition section, contain any defini-
tion of 'collective bargaining', but did contain (Sec. 8(d)) a provision stating
what collective bargaining was to consist of for the purposes of Section 8. It
was stated s the performance of the mutual obligation of the parties to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or with respect to the negotia-
tion of an agreement, or with respect to any question arising thereunder; and
the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
desired by either party. This mutual obligation was not to compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of any concession. Hence, the
Senate amendment, while it did not prescribe a purely objective test of what
constituted collective bargaining, as did the House bill, had to a very substan-
tial extent the same effect as the House bill in this regard, since it rejected,
as a factor in determining good faith, the test of making a concession and
thus prevented the Board from determining the merits of the positions of the
parties. 3 2
The Conference committee then reported that the Conference agreement fol-
29. S. Rep. No. 105, Soth Cong, Ist Sess. 22 (1947).
30. 93 Cong. Rec. 4138 (1947).
31. 93 Cong. Rem. 5005 (1947).
32. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. $10, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
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lowed in general the provisions of the Senate proposal, with certain clari-
fying changes which did not affect this portion of the definition.
This phraseology of the definition certainly does not conflict with, and even
tends to support, the conclusions drawn from the foregoing analysis of sec-
tion 8(d). The most that this legislative history indicates is that little
thought was given to the precise nature of the duty which sections 8(b)(3)
and 8(d) imposed on unions. Certainly it reveals a paucity of consideration as
to the application of the component requisites of the definition to a determina-
tion of whether a union has failed to fulfill its duty to bargain. Only a review
of the cases in which the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have
been called upon to apply it offer any real clue to its meaning today.
IV. REVIEW OF CASES
The legislative history of section 8(b) (3) of the Taft-Hartley amendments
to the Wagner Act and the very wording of section 8(d) of those amendments
indicate that the nature of the duty to bargain which is imposed upon unions
is identical with the duty placed upon the employer in section 8(5) of the
Wagner Act and now section 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley amendments. This
should follow, at least in so far as the conduct involved is clearly analogous,
as suggested in one case dealing with the union's duty. 8 Hence, some consid-
eration of the nature of the good faith obligation as expounded in a few of the
recent cases involving the employer's obligation should be helpful since the
courts and the Board have been influenced by the reasoning developed by the
employer cases. 34 ". . . [S]incerity of effort and intention to arrive at and
consummate an agreement . . ." become the elements of the good faith
requisite. 35 The ultimate issue as to whether the party conducts ". . . its bar-
gaining negotiations in good faith involves a finding of motive, or state of
mind which can only be inferred from circumstantial evidence."80
A review of the cases which have considered the union duty to bargain fall
generally within one or more of six types of conduct involved in the charged
violation of section 8(b) (3). Some of them refer to the good faith requisite
of section 8(d) in order to find a proscription of the conduct while others
find the conduct to be a more direct violation of the section. In analyzing
these cases it becomes useful to discover, where possible, which requisite of
collective bargaining the court or Board has held that the union has failed to,
fulfill.
A. Insistence Upon an Unlawful Provision
These cases were decided under what has been asserted as a well-established
principle: the Act does not permit ". . . the insistence, as a condition precedent
to entering into a collective bargaining agreement, that the other party to the
33. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 NL.R.B. 972 (1949).
34. See Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1224 (1948) (analysis of cases involving employer's
good faith obligation).
35. NLRB v. National Shoes Inc., 208 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1953).
36. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131, 140 (1st Cir. 1953).
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negotiations agree to a provision or take some action which is unlawful or
inconsistent with the basic policy of the Act." 37 Some of these cases by the
language used indicate that this conduct constitutes a direct violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (3) and does not merely indicate a failure to fulfill the good faith
obligation. The Board has reasoned that such intransigence did not reflect
'ran intention to avoid coming to any agreement" 3  by finding that substan-
tial evidence did not support a finding that the ".... adamant position with
respect to the hiring hall evinced a mind closed to persuasion and without
sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement, an attitude which the Board
and the courts have found to be incompatible with good-faith bargaining."3 9
The well-established principle regarding insistence upon an illegal provision
disposed of these cases as a per se violation.40 In another case, in which other
conduct was held to be a reflection on the good faith obligation, the insistence
upon an illegal provision was held to be a more direct violation since the Board
concluded that ". . . such a deliberate frustration of the operation of the bar-
gaining process violates the Act, in that it reflects a complete negation of that
duty to bargain which the amended Act imposes upon statutory representa-
tives of employees.1
41
Other cases suggest that such an insistence violates the good faith obliga-
tion and in that manner constitutes a refusal to bargain. One of these cases
indicates what is meant by good faith in section 8(d): "By finding lack of
good faith in such insistence I do not mean that it is done with 'evil purpose',
but merely that it is an insistence on inclusion of provisions without the scope
of proper negotiation between the parties which may constitute a bar to effect-
ing an accord."412 Still other cases give no indication as to whether they find
the insistence to be in direct violation or a violation by failure to fulfill the
good faith obligation.4 3 However, such conduct was not held to amount to a
37. National Maritime Union, CIO, 73 N.L.R.B. 971, 931-82 (1948).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. National Maritime Union, CIO, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (194S) (illegal hiring hall pro-
vision); accord, American Radio Association, CIO, 82 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949) (illegal
hiring hall provision); National Maritime Union, CIO, 82 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1949) (illegal
hiring hall provision).
41. Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1042 (1949) (a provision which
in effect would discriminate against nonunion employees), followed, American Nespaper
Publishers v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951); accord, International Typographical
Union, 87 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1949) (a provision which in effect would discriminate against
nonunion employees); International Typographical Union, 87 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1949) (a
provision which in effect would discriminate against nonunion employees); International
Typographical Union, 104 N.L.R.B. 806 (1953) (a provision which in effect would dis-
criminate against nonunion employees).
42. Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935, 942 (D.D. Cir. 1950) (invalid
dosed shop and benefits restricted to union members); cf. Local 421, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 81 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949) (illegal dosed shop dause).
43. Local 1664, International Lon,shoreman's Ass'n, 103 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1953) (illegal
hiring hall provision); Essex County and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters, 95
N.L.R.B. 969 (1951) (illegal dosed-shop provision).
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refusal to bargain if the union did not insist upon inclusion of the illegal pro-
vision"4 even though the final contract included it.4" Furthermore, the Board
found no refusal, and did not even designate as an indicium of lack of good
faith, a union's adamant insistence upon a hiring hall provision which it
did not find to be unlawful. 46 Since the provision was insisted upon as a con-
dition precedent to any bargaining,47 this would at least seem to be a refusal
to confer with respect to this condition of employment.
B. Refusal to Be Bound for More Than a Short Period
In a case in which one of the provisions insisted upon by the union would
permit the union to suspend or abrogate the contract, the court held that
".. . good faith does not permit such extraneous and unlawful provisions to
be insisted upon by an employee group as a condition of a wage agreement.
'48
The court held, "Collective bargaining under the Act therefore has two essen-
tial elements: (1) conferring with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and (2) that such conferring shall be done in good
faith."49 The Board in another case held that insistence upon a "60-day
cancellation clause" in the contract did not reflect a good faith attempt to
negotiate a mutually satisfactory contract, ". . . establishes a continuing dis-
regard . . . of the good-faith standards of bargaining required by the
Act .. .", and that unwillingness to be bound for more than 60 days rather
than the traditional term in itself raises a presumption that the party is not
bargaining in good faith.50
C. Seeking to Bargain Individually with an Employer Represented in a
Multi-Employer Bargaining Unit
The Board has held that seeking to bargain individually with an employer
represented in a multi-employer bargaining unit is not a violation of section
8(b) (3).51 This was held in a case in which violation of section 8(b) (3)
was not charged, but was alleged as a defense to a charge that an employer
44. Nassau County Typographical Union, AFL, 87 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), aff'd, 105
N.L.R.B. 902 (1953) (illegal policy merely alternative to acceptance of valid previous
oral contract).
45. International Longshoreman's Union, CIO, 90 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1950) (unlawful hir-
ig provisions).
46. National Union of Marine Cooks, 90 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1950).
47. Ibid.
48. Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935, 941 (D.D.C. 1950) (also in-
volved invalid closed shop and other discriminatory provision).
49. Id. at 939.
50. Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1043 (1949) (also involved
illegal provision), followed, American Newspaper Publishers v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th
Cir. 1951); accord, International Typographical Union, 87 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1949); In-
ternational Typographical Union, 87 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1949); International Typographical
Union, 104 N.L.R.B. 806 (1953).
51. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
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unlawfully discharged employees in violation of section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3)
of the Act6 2 because the employees of one member of an employer bargain-
ing association called a strike after an unsuccessful attempt to bargain with
that employer individually. The Board agreed that the union was required to
bargain with the associations as the agent of the employers until an impase
was reached. A majority of the Board found that the union had bargained
with association representatives until negotiations collapsed and, in proposing
negotiations with individual employers, did not seek to exclude association
representatives& 3
In one of its comments on the dissenting opinion which had suggested that
the union's overtures to the individual members of the multi-employer asso-
ciations are analogous to an employer's attempt to take unilateral action or
to deal with individual employees directly, rather than through their statutory
agent, the majority decision asserted that 1... the cases relied upon in the
dissent are wholly inapposite because the situations are not at all analogous.
Underlying the Board's holdings in all those cases is the concept that an
employer's unilateral action and individual bargaining is the antithesis of,
and derogates from, the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, which
it is the policy of the Act to encourage. Here, however, there was no attempt
by the Local to substitute unilateral action or individual bargaining for col-
lective bargaining, but only to substitute for one type of collective bargain-
ing (association-wide) another type of collective bargaining (on a single-
employer basis)."54
In affirming the Board decision the Court of Appeals extended this reason-
ing by drawing an analogy to other employer cases where it was stated:
"Moreover, the Supreme Court's condonation, in National Labor Relations
Board v. Crompton Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 224-225, 69 S. Ct. 960, 93 L. Ed.
1320, of certain Board decisions to the effect that an employer's unilateral
grant of a wage increase previously offered to and rejected by the union is not
an unfair labor practice would seem to indicate that, conversely, the Union's
submission, to the individual members of the Associations, of a proposal which
had been submitted to and rejected by the Associations would not be viola-
tive of Act."rl5
Conversely there is some indication that there would be no violation of
section 8(b) (3) where a union insists upon bargaining with a multi-employer
unit, at least as to unresolved items under the provisions of a valid persisting
multi-employer contract, and refuses to bargain individually with employer-
members of the unit who declined to bargain through the unit as to these
items. 6 However, one Federal District Court has held that the fact that a
multi-employer bargaining unit has been obstinate and hard to bargain with
52. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a) (1),(3) (Supp. 1955).
53. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
54. Id. at 419.
55. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1951).
56. N. B. Administrative Rulings of General Counsel, Case No. 993, Lab. Rel.
Rep. (34 L.R.R.N. 1439) (1954).
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is no defense to an action for a mandatory injunction against a union to bar-
gain collectively with that unit where there is evidence to support a finding
of a violation of section 8(b)(3).7
D. Outright Refusal to Bargain
Because labor organizations are formed primarily when employees desire
to negotiate with their employer, the cases in which the unions are charged
with unlawful refusal to bargain rarely involve any allegation of an outright
refusal by the union to meet and negotiate with the employer.68 Nevertheless,
in Penello v. United Mine Workers"0 the court found, among other violations
of section 8(b) (3) previously noted, an outright refusal by the union to accede
to a request for further bargaining conferences in direct violation of the
section.
E. Refusal to Reduce Agreement to Writing
Although no cases have so held, dicta indicates that a refusal to reduce an
agreement to writing would constitute a per se violation of the Act, provided,
of course, that an agreement had actually been reached 0° by all the parties,0 1
and even ". . . that an announcement at the outset of conferences of an un-
willingness to reduce a contract to writing is per se violative of the Act."0 2
F. Demand for Posting of a Performance Bond
The Board held in one case that a demand by the union that the employer
post a $5,000 performance bond as a condition to the settlement of a strike
constituted a refusal to bargain6 3 by drawing an analogy to a case where a
similar demand by an employer was held to be a refusal to bargain.0' In the
Teamsters case the Board held that ". . . the Union's good faith in advanc-
ing this proposal is not decisive of the issue."0 5 Such language suggests that
they viewed the demand as a more direct refusal than merely as an indicium
of lack of good faith.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of section 8(b)(3) and 8(d) offers very little evi-
dence of a clear concept of the definition of collective bargaining in the minds
of the legislators. A review of the cases has revealed only rare insight into
the component parts of the definition and the apparent relationship of the
good faith obligation among those parts. The cases do serve to emphasize a
57. Madden v. United Mine Workers, 79 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1948).
58. 16 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 220 (1951).
59. 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950).
60. International Molders Union, AFL, 91 N.L.R.B. 139 (1950).
61. N.L.R.B. Administrative Ruling of General Counsel, Case No. 43, Lab. Rel. Rep.
(27 L.R.R.M. 1362) (1951).
62. Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1042 n. 3 (1949).
63. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
64. jasper Blackburn Products Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940).
65. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 979 (1949).
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dictum from a Supreme Court case which recognizes that .. . a statutory
standard such as 'good faith' can have meaning only in its application to the
particular facts of a particular case.7"0 Giving a clearer meaning to the good
faith standard in its application to the particular facts of a particular case
demands a clearer analysis of the elements of the collective bargaining defini-
tion than has heretofore been revealed in the cases. The analysis of the
definition in section 8(d) suggests that a consideration of the facts in each
case should follow a pattern established by the grammatical construction of
that definition. That construction establishes the following pattern to be used
in a consideration of the facts:
(1) Whether the acts or conduct amount to an outright refusal to bargain.
(2) Whether the acts or conduct violate one of the objective requisites in
the definition.
(3) Whether the acts or conduct, by their nature, constitute indicia of a
lack of good faith.
(4) If the acts or conduct do constitute such indicia, whether, when con-
sidered in the light of all the facts in the case, they support a finding of a
failure to fulfill the subjective good faith requisite.
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity in the Textile Workers case
to clarify the meaning of the statutory definition of collective bargaining.
The court will there be dealing with acts and conduct by the union which
amount to harassing tactics s with the purpose of bringing economic pressure
to bear upon the employer in support of lawful bargaining demands. The acts
and conduct involved in this case do not amount to an outright refusal to
bargain nor do they violate any of the objective requisites in the definition of
collective bargaining. The question is whether, by their nature, they constitute
indicia of a lack of good faith. The Circuit Court has held that they do not
since ". . . there is not the slightest inconsistency between genuine desire
to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure to get the kind of agree-
ment one wants."' 69 If the Supreme Court affirms the Circuit Court decision
they will establish the union's right to use economic pressure in the form of
harassing tactics without bringing itself within the proscriptions of the good
faith obligation. If the Court reverses the Circuit Court, it will have estab-
lished a new proscription under the requisite of good faith which does not
66. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 US. 395, 410 (1952).
67. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 103 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforcement denied, 227
F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 US. 1004 (1956).
68. "But the Trial Examiner and the Board found that the Union 'decided "to force
the employer's hand in the then current negotiations," not by a strike "in the commonly
understood sense of the word," but by a series of unprotected hara-sing tactics: an or-
ganized refusal to work overtime, an unauthorized extension of rest periods from 10 to
15 minutes, the direction of employees to refuse to work special hours, slowdowns, un-
announced walkouts, and inducing employees of a subcontractor not to work for the
employer'." Textile Workers Union, CIO v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
69. Ibid.
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appear to be consistent with the established criterion of determining lack of
good faith by finding intent not to reach an agreement. 70 In either event, the
Supreme Court has an opportunity in this decision to set forth a pattern to
be followed by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts in their
consideration of cases in which a union has been charged with a violation of
its duty to bargain collectively in good faith.
70. See NLRB v. National Shoes Inc., 208 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953); Rapid Roller
Co. v. NLRB, 126 F. 2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. George P. Pilling and Son Co.,
119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941).
